Fodor’s Misconstrual of Wittgenstein in the Language of Thought :: Philosophy Essays

Fodors Misconstrual of Wittgenstein in the manner of speaking of Thought In his book, The Language of Thought, Jerry Fodor claims that i) Wittgensteins personal language argument is not in fact against Fodors theory, and ii) Wittgensteins private language argument isnt really any good (70). In this paper I hope to show that Fodors second claim is patently false. In aid of this I will consider Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations (243-363), Jerry Fodors The Language of Thought (55-97), as well as Anthony Kennys Wittgenstein (178-202). First I shall summarize Wittgensteins argument then I will examine Fodors response and explain why it is fallacious. In my catch up with, Fodor is wrong because he takes Wittgenstein to be a verificationist, and also because he makes a false analogy between deal and computers. Anthony Kenny, in his book Wittgenstein, provides a concise summary and penetrating interpretation of Wittgensteins so-called private language argument (henceforth PLA). According to Kenny, the basic order of business of the PLA can be summed up in a quotation from Wittgensteins Tractatus Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt only can exist where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said. (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.51) In making his argument, Wittgenstein addresses the belief that the knowledge we have of our own experiences can be expressed to ourselves or others, and that this expression does not assume acquaintance with the external sphere or other minds. Logically entailed by these beliefs is the idea that there is a private language in which words derive their meaning by creation linked with private experiences. In other words, a subject forms internal ostensive definitions. This means simply that the subject is exposed to and attends to an expe rience and associates it with a word. For Wittgenstein, this view is mistaken experience is not private, and words do not acquire meaning by bare ostensive definition. Wittgenstein takes private language to mean a language in which words refer to the immediate private sensations of the speaker in this manner of private ostensive definitions. If a speaker has a genuine sensation, she does not necessarily know that sensation only from her own case.